A 12 months of battle within the Center East has destroyed the foreign-policy strategy of Iran’s supreme chief, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. His technique was all the time implausible, however its collapse has led Iran to the brink of its first worldwide battle since 1988.
What I wish to name the Khamenei Doctrine—these near him have variously dubbed it “strategic persistence” or, extra to the purpose, “no peace, no battle”—rests on a duality that has remained fixed by Khamenei’s 35 years in energy. Iran refuses any public dealings with Israel, clamoring as an alternative for the Jewish state’s destruction and surrounding it with Arab militias that search to destroy it. Iranian officers deny the Holocaust and chant “Loss of life to America” at occasions and ceremonies. And but, at no level does Khamenei intend to get right into a direct battle with Israel or the USA—as a result of he is aware of very properly that such a confrontation could possibly be deadly for his regime.
So what’s the level of holding this contradictory posture? Khamenei is a real fanatic. He solid his beliefs as a revolutionary within the Sixties, when he learn Sayyid Qutb and Mao Zedong. However he isn’t blind or silly. Quite, he’s affected person and pragmatic. He seems to have accepted that his dream of destroying Israel gained’t be realized in his lifetime, however he stays ideologically dedicated to it as a long-term aim for Islamists throughout generations. He has declared that Israel gained’t exist in 2040—a 12 months he’ll see provided that he lives to be greater than 100. However he seeks to advance the trigger to the extent he can, constructing the energy of Israel’s enemies, after which handing off the duty to his successors.
Khamenei is aware of that his excessive worldview shouldn’t be well-liked amongst most Iranians, and even amongst a lot of the nation’s ruling elite. And so he adjusts the institutional steadiness among the many Islamic Republic’s varied political factions, utilizing the competitors amongst them to realize respiratory house when crucial, however by no means wavering from his goals.
He makes worldwide changes with comparable strategic warning. He pursued the 2015 nuclear cope with the USA and different world powers to alleviate the diplomatic and financial strain on Iran. However through the negotiations, Iran made clear that its help for regional militias, and its anti-Israeli and anti-American orientation, was nonnegotiable. Iran would discuss solely about its nuclear program, regardless of the considerations that Western negotiators expressed over Iran’s “regional conduct.” Then President Donald Trump tore up the deal in 2018 and introduced a coverage of most strain to bear on the Islamic Republic. Khamenei delivered his response in a sermon in 2019: “There shall be no battle, and we gained’t negotiate.” He was referring to the USA, however the phrase was an apt abstract of his strategy to Israel as properly.
From the perspective of many Iranians, Khamenei’s insurance policies have been disastrous, bringing worldwide isolation, financial spoil, and political repression. However for his personal functions, earlier than October 7, 2023, the chief may need seen his coverage as a fantastic success.
When Khamenei ascended to energy in 1989, a lot of the area’s Arab states had lengthy since given up the struggle in opposition to Israel; Khamenei picked up the anti-Zionist mantle and made Iran the only provider for anti-Israeli militias throughout the area. He constructed a so-called Axis of Resistance, uniting armed teams in Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq to shoot at Israel, name for its destruction, and infrequently skirmish with U.S. forces within the area. All of this was a win for Islamist internationalism. Within the service of that agenda, Khamenei has proven little compunction about sacrificing Iran’s potential as a rustic for its almost 90 million inhabitants.
However the Khamenei Doctrine was all the time untenable, and the occasions of the previous 12 months have proven why. The technique—construct up anti-Israeli forces incrementally, with out getting right into a direct confrontation—required a sure adroitness. At instances, Khamenei has needed to restrain the Axis forces with requires prudence. And the Axis is itself an issue—unwieldy, typically insubordinate, and unpopular at house and overseas.
Many of the Axis militias are Shiite (Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are the exceptions), and a few have participated within the area’s sectarian civil wars, which claimed hundreds of Sunni Muslim victims—Iraqis, Syrians, and Palestinians. For that reason, not even anti-Israeli populations within the area are unreservedly enthusiastic in regards to the Axis. Inside Iran, in the meantime, Khamenei has a tough time promoting his animus in opposition to Israel to a populace that largely doesn’t share it, and that holds him to account for issues nearer to house. When Iranians stand up in opposition to their regime—as they did in 2009, 2017, 2019, and 2022—they typically use slogans that sign their displeasure with Iran’s help for the Axis. In all probability the best-known is “Neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, I give my life to Iran!”
The October 7 assault on Israel and the battle in Gaza that adopted at first seemed like a present to Khamenei. The battle would foreclose the potential for a Saudi rapprochement with Israel and disrupt what Israelis had taken to calling their “rising circle of peace” with Arab international locations (Khamenei has lengthy sought to forestall such normalization). However a 12 months later, Khamenei’s doctrine has by no means seemed weaker. Iran and its Axis declare to be the defenders of the Palestinian trigger—however they’ve thus far prevented instantly intervening in a battle that they themselves name “genocide.” Firstly of the battle, Iranian hard-liners expressed anger that Tehran was not becoming a member of the struggle. “Kids die underneath rubble whereas our missiles rot of their silos,” tweeted a well known anchor on Iranian state tv. Hezbollah, some regional analysts grumbled, was being held again by Iranians consumed by their very own slim pursuits.
In April, Israel attacked an Iranian consular constructing in Damascus, and Iran lastly did what it had not completed in its complete historical past: It fired missiles and drones instantly at Israel. Removed from being deterred, Benjamin Netanyahu’s authorities has since solely upped the strain on the Islamic Republic, killing Iranian and Axis commanders wherever it could and intensifying the battle in Lebanon. It’s pummeling Hezbollah with particular depth, killing dozens of its high commanders, together with its chief, Hassan Nasrallah, and, likely, his would-be successor, Hashem Safieddine. After a lot reticence, Khamenei launched one other spherical of missile assaults on October 1. And Israel has vowed to retaliate.
Khamenei has thus introduced his nation to the brink of a battle that he has lengthy sought to concurrently counsel and keep away from. Mostafa Najafi, a Tehran-based safety professional who supported the Iranian assaults in April and October, assured me that Iran was ready for no matter drive Israel would possibly deliver to bear. The nation has readied itself with “all of its protection capabilities” on alert, he mentioned; it has invested in home air defenses and purchased Russian-made S300 surface-to-air missile programs. Nonetheless, Najafi conceded that Iran’s dimension will make it troublesome to defend. Different consultants I spoke with took a bleaker view. “It’s not clear how Tehran can climb out of this example,” Mojtaba Dehghani, an Iranian professional with an in depth understanding of the regime elites, instructed me. “They don’t seem to be prepared for this battle.”
Many within the Iranian opposition argue that Tehran ought to cease stoking hostilities with Israel and the USA and prioritize financial improvement as an alternative. The stipulation is present in most opposition political platforms, together with these of leftist teams, a lot of which help a two-state answer for Israel and Palestine. Dehghani agrees with the demand and thinks that some within the regime management would possibly concur. However he says that such an enormous “paradigm shift” shall be troublesome to tug off with Khamenei nonetheless in energy. The chief is 85, and nobody actually is aware of who will succeed him, or whether or not that succession will usher in new outlooks and commitments; such uncertainty complicates planning for something past the seen horizon.
Within the meantime, Khamenei holds his nation hostage to a doctrine that courts the battle it additionally seeks to keep away from. Iran must make a historic shift whether it is to avert a disastrous battle that few Iranians need—and start constructing a greater future as an alternative.
